The GiveWell Blog

Philanthropedia’s report on microfinance

I believe that Philanthropedia has a promising model. We were glad to join with them on a recent press release urging donors to look beyond administrative expense ratios. We are potentially interested in collaborating with them and/or incorporating their work in the future. I examined their new report on microfinance with great interest.

At this point, I feel that Philanthropedia’s execution of the model has too many serious problems to make it of use to a donor, or to make it a positive influence on the sector. Philanthropedia is a very young organization and we expect/hope to see major improvement, which is why we are sharing these detailed thoughts (we have also discussed them with Philanthropedia).

Overview:

  • The definition of a Philanthropedia “expert” is unclear, and we are concerned that the distinction between experience and expertise is being neglected.
  • Only 31 of 131 “experts” even appear to have their names accessible on the site. The little we know about the “experts” gives us substantial concerns about their representativeness and credibility.
  • Because of concerns about who the experts are, how they are chosen, and what criteria they are applying, we find that we can’t make sense of the final output (i.e., recommended microfinance organizations). We disagree strongly with the recommendations, but cannot see enough of what went into them to examine the sources of the disagreement.
  • We would not want donors to give based on this report, not only because of the problems listed above, but because we believe that doing so would reinforce bad incentives.

Details follow. This is a long post, but if you are a nonprofit professional interested in the Philanthropedia model – or a donor considering following its recommendations – I urge you to read it all. There are more substantial concerns than I can present briefly.


The definition of a Philanthropedia “expert” is unclear

How does Philanthropedia define an “expert”? The most specific answer I can find to this question is via the Philanthropedia blog: “To find these experts, we do a variety of things such as research thought leaders in the space, look for program officers at foundations who specialize in this area, research universities who have faculty focused on these issues, identify journalists who write extensively about the topic, look for executive directors or heads of nonprofits working in the space, etc.” The Philanthropedia FAQ adds that “We target experts in a social cause through a combination of cold emails and warm referrals (on the basis of professional and personal connections).”

But the numerical breakdown of experts cites 8% academics, 8% funders, 53% nonprofit executives, and 24% unspecified “others.” (We’re not sure why the percentages add up to <100% but consider this a minor issue.)

  • Why such a large proportion of nonprofit executives and “others”? Is this proportion deliberate, based on any particular view of the right proportions, or has it simply “fallen out” of which people Philanthropedia was able to reach and which chose to participate? Is it a function of the “personal connections” mentioned by the Philanthropedia FAQ?
  • It seems clear that these numbers don’t come close to the total numbers of academics, nonprofit executives, etc. who would have relevant perspectives. So why these “experts” and not others? Philanthropedia’s description of its process is too vague to give an answer to this question.
  • Who are the “others?” Are they all “journalists who write extensively on the topic” or do many fall into the “etc.” category?

Philanthropedia is all about trust. It provides very little information that donors can assess for themselves – the premise is that experts are better positioned to make recommendations. So it is essential to be crystal clear about just what constitutes the “expertise” that makes someone’s opinion so much more valuable and credible than an individual donor’s. We feel that Philanthropedia needs to add a substantial amount of information before it can be considered clear enough.

And as we have written before, we believe there is a huge difference between “experience” and “expertise” – particularly in the nonprofit sector with its broken feedback loops.

Who are the experts?

When we look at what information is available about the “experts” behind the microfinance report, we note:

  • The report appears to have surveyed 131 total “experts.” As mentioned above, the vast majority of these are nonprofit executives and “other” and only 8% (~10) are academics.
  • This leaves very little room for representation of microfinance skeptics. Nearly everyone, if not everyone, surveyed is likely coming from a worldview that embraces the core assumptions behind the pro-microfinance mentality, and thus embraces microfinance the way it is currently carried out. It seems fairly clear how this issue can lead to bias: for example, people who are already committed enough to microfinance’s potential to be funders/nonprofit executives seem likely to focus more on scale (reaching as many people as possible) rather than social impact (asking critical questions about microfinance’s effect on clients).
  • Names and affiliations are provided for only 31 of the 131 “experts.” For 21 of the 31, the only information given is the name, position and organization name (and not all of these organizations can easily be found on the web – for example, is this the WAVE Foundation that employs Anwar Hossain, who is listed as one of the “experts”?)
  • What we can see about these “experts” sheds very little light on how they were chosen and how representative they are.
    • Some are top-level executives and some are not.
    • 3 of the 31 represent Unitus; one represents Tearfund, a very large charity working in diverse areas; but other major U.S. microfinance-focused charities such as Grameen Foundation and FINCA have no representatives in this set. (Perhaps Unitus’s heavy representation has something to do with its low rank, since Philanthropedia requires that nonprofit professionals not vote for their own organization.)
    • In what regions have these “experts” done their work? With what kinds of programs? In what ways might their experience and allegiances be biased? Do they have valuable experience and impressive accomplishments or merely many years of being employed in this area? We don’t have the information that could address these questions.

The recommended charities

As stated above, Philanthropedia provides very little information on the recommended charities aside from their names, links to their websites, and figures whose exact meaning is unclear but which seem to indicate the level of “expert support.”

Our main observation is that the list reads like a “who’s who in large U.S. microfinance charities.” This pertains to our above observation that microfinance skeptics don’t seem well represented.

Most of the ratings are clustered fairly close together (7%-11% range). Accion is at the top with 19%, and CARE, FINCA and Unitus are at the bottom. It’s unclear exactly what these numbers mean – should we take from this that Accion is particularly outstanding or that Unitus has problems? Probably not, since Philanthropedia states that it doesn’t rank nonprofits.

We would not, at this point, recommend any of the charities listed:

The “expert quotes” provided by Philanthropedia do not address these concerns, and in fact raise questions about whether the “experts” are even trying to help donors accomplish good. Take the Kiva page for an example. (Click “Expert assessment” from that link to view quotes.) Nearly all strengths listed pertain to Kiva’s marketing ability: “They have a cute model,” “They are appealing to donors,” and more. In other words, you are being advised to give to a charity because it’s good at making you want to give to it.

The few comments that pertain to other aspects of Kiva raise other concerns:

  • “They are truly innovative as a capital source for microfinance institutions.” The exact nature of the innovation is unspecified, but probably amounts to more praise for the marketing.
  • “Kiva charges 0% interest rate on capital.” Kiva charges 0% to its partners, but borrowers have to pay interest. Is that a good thing, and if so, why?
  • “They provide a direct link from funder to borrower” – this is simply false.
  • “They are not neglecting the US domestic poverty issue” – this comment comes up in more than one organization’s profile. We have argued that it is better not to focus on US domestic poverty; in any case, this is clearly a difficult, value-laden judgment call.

The “expert quotes” on other organizations raise similar concerns. Overall, it is not apparent that the “experts” are giving advice based on how an individual donor can have the most impact. It is not clear what their recommendations mean.

As for our own take on which microfinance charities are best, we have deep concerns about this sector that have led us to go beyond U.S. charities and seek out outstanding microfinance institutions. We’ll be writing about more about the best we’ve found, the Small Enterprise Foundation.

We are coming from an attitude of skepticism toward microfinance in general. Our skepticism is certainly debatable, but we have been explicit about it and discussed our thoughts on microfinance at length. A donor who wants to know where our advice is coming from and what it’s based on can find out. We feel it is important that donors have similar context on the people cited by Philanthropedia.

Reinforcing bad incentives

We pay a lot of attention to incentives. When discussing how we should rate charities, we constantly ask, “If charities all knew we were handing out ratings on this basis and expected donors to give based on our ratings, how would they work the system? What would we expect to change?” (For example, we give negative reviews to charities that publish no information, not just charities whose materials raise concerns; we don’t want to provide incentives to hide information.)

We feel that if Philanthropedia stuck to its current approach and donors used it:

  • “Experts” would not have any incentives to increase their own transparency above current, unacceptable levels. They could influence others’ giving by giving recommendations without substantive reasons and without even disclosing their names.
  • Charities would have strong incentives to do whatever got them recommended by Philanthropedia’s set of experts. This could include networking, flattery, wining/dining, outright conflicts of interest, and learning to speak of their programs in ways that would appeal to Philanthropedia experts, all of which might end up being more cost-effective from the charities’ perspective than optimizing and demonstrating their social impact.

Bottom line
I urge Philanthropedia to:

  • Publish exhaustive details of how “experts” are defined, selected and invited.
  • Publish names and affiliations of all experts who are invited to participate, whether or not they accept.
  • It is particularly important to publish names and affiliations for those who do participate because donors should not be asked to trust anonymous people.
  • Address the concerns we have raised about the representativeness and credibility of experts, if these concerns still appear valid once the identities and process are disclosed.
  • Publish the templates for all surveys sent to experts. Be explicit about the criteria by which experts are asked to recommend charities.
  • Ask experts to make their best case publicly and to be clear about whether they’re recommending charities to impact-focused donors, praising charities for marketing abilities, or something else.

We believe the Philanthropedia model has a lot of potential. We would find great use, for donors and for ourselves, in a site that could credibly claim to have assembled the charities with the most support from people with relevant experience.

Philanthropedia has accomplished a lot in a short time, but we don’t believe its content is yet appropriate for distribution to individual donors looking for help with their giving decisions.

You can save a life

We ask you, as a donor, to turn down some great pitches – “Your interest-free loan will help this person escape poverty forever,” “You can give a cow to a poor family for Christmas,” etc. – and give instead to charities that aren’t terribly good at storytelling. Why?

It comes down to this. We think that most of those stories are just that – stories. (For more, see our summary of recent posts on “big-name” charities, which we feel are representative of the full set of charities we’ve reviewed.) But if you give to one of our top charities, you really can save (or dramatically change) a human life.

It hasn’t been easy to find charities that we can honestly say this about. That’s what our process is built around and where most of our energy goes. This week we’ve blogged about the best we’ve found, VillageReach and Stop Tuberculosis Partnership. There is plenty of room for doubt even with them, but overall we think there is a strong case – even for the skeptic – that your donation to them can save a life.

What do we mean when we say “save a life?”

By “you can save a life,” we don’t mean anything as simple, concrete, or easy to grasp as the stories charities usually tell.

  • Your gift can’t literally be linked to an individual. It will help an organization that, all things considered, is achieving a lot of impact for what it spends.
  • If you must know what “your” dollars are doing, it’s likely that they’ll be sitting in reserves to ensure financial stability, or enabling a slightly larger travel budget for evaluators, or something similarly unexciting.
  • It’s even highly possible that your donations will be wasted, and that the charity you give to – even the best you can find – will fail. We don’t think there are true guarantees in aid.
  • Even if these charities are succeeding, it’s very likely that your donation won’t ultimately result in the charity doing anything differently. It’s pretty hard to think about how $1000, by itself, could really change anything about Stop TB Partnership‘s plans for next year.
  • Yet donations add up. 50-100 of these donations could mean a significantly larger grant, more people getting tuberculosis treatment … and that could mean families staying intact instead of being struck by sudden death.

The truth is that it takes a lot of abstraction and analytical thinking to really think about how your donation saves a life. The life you can save is an “expected” life (“expected” in the sense of probabilistic expected value) – it isn’t a person we can point to or show you a picture of. More than with typical charities, you have to use your imagination. But more than with typical charities, your impact is real.

With opportunity comes responsibility

In The Life You Can Save (which prominently features GiveWell and which we have reviewed), Peter Singer writes:

By donating a relatively small amount of money, you could save a child’s life … we all spend money on things we don’t really need, whether on drinks, meals out, clothing, movies, concerts, vacations, new cars, or house renovation. Is it possible that by choosing to spend your money on such things rather than contributing to an aid agency, you are leaving a child to die, a child you could have saved? (pg 5)

Our corollary: is it possible that you are leaving a child to die when you choose to donate to a charity with a “feel-good” story rather than a charity with a great case for real impact?

It is true that, as our critics often point out, a charity can be impactful without being demonstrably impactful. But when one charity proves itself and another leaves you guessing, it seems clear to us which one offers the “better bet” – and more “expected lives saved” – given the information available. When you have the option of giving to an outstanding charity that demonstrably can save a life, how do you justify giving to a charity whose true impact is essentially a big question mark?

I’ll leave this blog’s last words for 2009 to Natalie, a relatively recent GiveWell hire (she has been working full-time on research since July).

Sometimes I’m almost tempted to give to a charity I know less about. I’ve been over VillageReach and I’ve seen how complex the situation is and how many questions there are. If I gave to some charity I know nothing about, I could just think about the story they tell and feel good and not have these nagging doubts. But I’m not going to do that – in the end it’s more important to me that I really make a difference.

GiveWell’s top-rated charities

VillageReach

VillageReach currently holds the top slot in our top charities list. While I will be donating to the Stop Tuberculosis partnership (discussed yesterday), Elie’s donation this year went to VillageReach.

VillageReach consults on health system logistics in high-poverty, remote areas to help life-saving supplies get to those who need them. It may not be the most attention-grabbing story (“improving operational efficiency” doesn’t have the same ring to it as giving a cow or fixing a smile), but

In other words, VillageReach would be accomplishing tremendous good if it could improve logistics to deliver more vaccines. Can it?

Pilot project

VillageReach assessed its pilot project in Mozambique (Cabo Delgado province) with more thoroughness than we’ve seen almost anywhere outside of JPAL and IPA. It is a great demonstration that just because a charity is relatively small, and experimental, doesn’t mean it can’t collect substantive and compelling evidence regarding its impact.

VillageReach collected (and has now published) data on trends in vaccine/supply deliveries, “stock-outs” of vaccines (the single most compelling indicator, in our view) and vaccination coverage rates. It also conducted vaccination coverage surveys in both the province where it worked and a nearby province for comparison. After examining this evidence along with some independent analysis with our own, we’ve concluded that the case for impact (despite not including a randomized controlled trial) is quite compelling: VillageReach caused a significant jump in vaccination rates, which we believe can be fairly extrapolated to lives saved at well under $1000 each.

VillageReach hoped to transfer responsibility for the modified logistics system (which has a dedicated team responsible for delivering supplies, rather than each clinic responsible for its own collection) to the government, but available evidence suggests that the transfer failed. The fact that vaccination rates have since fallen is further evidence that VillageReach made a difference while they were there, but obviously discouraging relative to what they had hoped for. We have expressed doubts in the past about donors’ getting their hopes up for “sustainability” in aid, and think it’s worth noting that even VillageReach’s project – with its strong case for impact as well as a case that it actually would save the government money – has so far failed at the ambitious goal of changing government practices.

More details at the “Does it work?” section of our review.

The future of VillageReach

There are a lot of questions about the future of VillageReach. As a small organization, it sees frequent changes in its plans and engagements. It has taken on a variety of consulting projects, some of which we have little information about and could be significantly different from where it has succeeded before.

However, it has provided an unusual amount of clarity and specificity about the likely use of additional donations. We feel that VillageReach can productively absorb up to $2.5 million in unrestricted donations over the next year and that these funds will be used for work very similar to its pilot project: reactivating its program in the original province, in addition to possibly expanding to one or more neighboring provinces.

Pros and cons

VillageReach is very different from the “ideal charity” we had in mind early in our international aid research. (Our “ideal charity” is much closer to the charity I discussed yesterday, the Stop Tuberculosis Partnership). It is relatively small and still represents something of an experiment, which has both pros and cons.

VillageReach is a small charity that has struggled at times to raise enough funding, not a large charity built to absorb huge sums of money.

  • This adds a certain kind of uncertainty to its situation, as its plans hinge heavily on how fundraising goes as well as other factors (such as government cooperation) outside its control.
  • But being small also comes with advantages for a donor. The need for more funding is extremely concrete and some extra funding could make a huge difference to VillageReach’s ability to perform up to its potential. In addition, it is feasible – if difficult – to have a complete view of VillageReach’s work. Where a large charity like Stop TB Partnership relies heavily on audits and spot-checks – leaving open a lot of room for unobservable error – VillageReach is measuring, and accountable for, the results of everything it does.

VillageReach has only one demonstrable success to its credit. It is still establishing the potential of its model.

  • VillageReach is “experimental” in a sense. It doesn’t have the same consistency, accomplishing similar results in many times and places, as Stop TB Partnership.
  • However, we think this is a very different level of “experiment” from an organization with no demonstrated impact. We think there is enough information about VillageReach’s past impact for an individual donor to be confident that its future activities are a “good bet.”
  • And with the risk of an “experiment” comes upside. If VillageReach continues to demonstrate success, it could affect the way health logistics works all over the world, through the spread of information rather than through its own funds. The problem we have with most “experiments” in international aid is that we aren’t convinced that they will produce the information needed to (a) determine whether they’ve succeeded and (b) bring about widespread adoption if they have. By contrast, VillageReach has demonstrated a willingness and ability to produce credible evidence of impact.

VillageReach does not fully share GiveWell’s priorities.

  • We are most interested in “doing more of something that demonstrably improves lives.” VillageReach has expressed great interest – and allocated funds to – the more ambitious goal of “advocacy” (broadly defined), changing the way governments and larger funders operate.
  • Yet even as it aims for these more ambitious goals, we believe that VillageReach is in fact saving lives at a level of cost-effectiveness that rivals that of any other charity. So we see its more ambitious goals almost as a “bonus” – if it succeeds at them, we’ll have helped fund a truly incredible level of impact, and if it fails at them, we still expect to have gotten our “money’s worth” (lives saved for under $1000 each).

Bottom line

The pros and cons listed above are largely mirror images of each other. Stop TB Partnership is an outstanding “large charity” – with both the advantages and concerns that accompany great size – and VillageReach is an outstanding “small charity,” with a different set of advantages and concerns. Both give good answers to all our major questions, leaving only the kind of concerns that are likely inevitable with charities of their size.

Which you have more confidence in, and prefer to donate to, is a judgment call. We have ranked VillageReach as our top charity because Elie and I happen to agree that it seems like a “better bet” overall (to approach the impact implied by the academic cost-effectiveness estimates) – we think the ability to hold it fully accountable outweighs the risks that come with being small and experimental.

Elie and I do part ways when it comes to the ultimate donation decision. I am giving to Stop TB Partnership for the personal values-related reasons discussed yesterday. Elie doesn’t share the values I mentioned and has donated to VillageReach.

Stop Tuberculosis Partnership

The Stop Tuberculosis Partnership is one of our top-rated charities and the one I will personally be giving to this year.

Like most charities, the Stop Tuberculosis Partnership has an admirable goal. It uses donations to fund grants of tuberculosis drugs to governments, and also assists them with (and monitors their implementation of) the WHO-recommended tuberculosis control strategy. It’s an appealing activity because:

As with most charities, the story doesn’t end there – there is a lot that can go wrong with tuberculosis control, and we came at the Stop Tuberculosis Partnership with a lot of questions. But unlike most charities, the Stop Tuberculosis Partnership has provided stellar answers that have increased our confidence in what it’s doing. A sample:

Do governments use the drugs for treatment, or sell/lose/misuse the drugs?

  • In order to receive the drugs, governments must agree to provide a certain level of coverage, i.e., free treatment for patients, as well as adhering to multiple other conditions of the WHO-recommended tuberculosis control strategy.
  • Stop TB then performs spot checks of medical facilities (audits at locations chosen by Stop TB, not by the governments) as well as examination of country-wide data (particularly treatment success rates) and data reporting systems.
  • Treatment success rates are generally high.

The answer to the above question relies on audits. Does Stop TB carry out these audits consistently and produce substantive information on country compliance? We have positive though not fully conclusive indications.

  • We have seen four audit reports – those of the highest-burden countries – and found them to be quite substantive and straightforward about strengths and weaknesses of the TB control programs.
  • We believe that the audits are carried out consistently, as Stop TB’s annual reports from 2003-2005 summarized the outcomes of audit reports from all drug grant recipients. Stop TB has changed its reporting format, but has told us that it still does audit all grantees.
  • We have seen specific instances of funding being cut off for noncompliance. (See Stop TB’s progress reports). It is very rare to see a charity publicly disclosing a shortcoming like this, and to be able to confirm that it was handled appropriately.
  • Details at the “Does it work?” section of our Stop TB review.

But even if the governments are carrying out quality tuberculosis control programs, how much of Stop TB’s support is really resulting in more coverage – as opposed to simply substituting for funds the government would have spent anyway? We would guess that there is a degree of “fungibility,” but feel that Stop TB takes significant steps to maximize the impact of its funds.

  • Pre-grant, it conducts detailed analysis of governments’ other sources of funding.

  • Post-grant, it examines trends in the coverage of treatment before and after it became a funder. Though these trends do not have the rigor of a randomized controlled trial, we feel they provide reasonable evidence that Stop TB’s funding results in additional coverage.
  • Details at the discussion of this issue in our review.

Does Stop TB, itself, have room for more funding?

  • Stop TB has provided us with analysis of projected revenues and expenses, showing a significant gap (about $10 million a year over the next four years). We are not cleared to post this analysis publicly, but Stop TB will consider sharing it with interested donors who contact them.
  • We have also tried to dig into the exact meaning of this “gap,” and have only been partially satisfied with the response.
    • Stop TB has cited specific examples of underfunded countries whose “buffer stock” has had to be cut (so that they have enough drugs to treat the projected number of patients, but little margin for error).
    • It has also stated to us that more funding would enable it to approve the treatment of more patients.
    • It has not provided quantitative scenario analysis, so it’s hard for us to be fully concrete about what additional donations can be expected to lead to (in terms of # people approved for treatment and in terms of treating more people vs. providing “buffer stock”).
    • Details at the discussion of this issue in our review.

Bottom line

  • Big picture: Stop TB is the best international example we’ve found of a “proven, cost-effective, scalable, transparent” charity. It focuses on one highly cost-effective and proven intervention, collects and shares the information needed to address the questions we’ve come up with (and then some), and projects a significant funding gap. It is both large (significant ability to absorb more funding) and programmatically focused. It has both an excellent goal/program (tuberculosis treatment) and outstanding reporting on how its specific activities are going.
  • That doesn’t mean we have no concerns. There are a lot of moving pieces here and a lot of complexity (as with just about any charity working internationally). Stop TB takes all the measures we find reasonable to assess its impact, and provides a strong picture of impact overall, but we would guess that there are many problems that its audits simply aren’t comprehensive enough to catch, as well as questions about “fungibility of money” that can’t be fully answered.
  • Tomorrow we will discuss VillageReach, a very different charity that we are ultimately slightly more confident in, although there are major pros and cons to both. I am personally giving to Stop TB because (a) I put more weight on preventing adult deaths than on preventing child deaths (and tuberculosis affects adults more than vaccine-preventable diseases do); (b) VillageReach works in the most remote areas, while Stop TB works in a great variety of areas. I prefer (all else equal) to help people in less remote areas, who I believe have more opportunities (for themselves and for helping others).

UPenn Center for High-Impact Philanthropy

Before giving season ends, we wanted to make sure to put in a good word for the UPenn Center for High-Impact Philanthropy (which we have mentioned before).

We have carefully reviewed the Center’s reports on malaria and U.S. education, both of which overlap heavily with the research we have done. We consistently find their statements to be research- and evidence-based, with citations that make it clear where their reasoning comes from. Their reports are focused on the practical issues of philanthropy and give examples of specific successful nonprofit programs.

We have learned from these reports and we believe they have significant value for donors.

We haven’t yet carefully reviewed their most recent report, on U.S. housing, health and hunger, but if and when we research these causes it will be one of the first sources we consult.

As Peter Singer and William Easterly recently discussed, there is a severe shortage of groups that provide substantive public information about the facts of giving and the research relevant to it. The Singer/Easterly discussion noted GiveWell and Good Intentions are Not Enough (another resource we find helpful) as examples of such groups. We think that the Center belongs on the list as well.

Celebrated charities that we don’t recommend

Note added April 2024: As we explain on our mistakes page, the tone of this blog post, which was written much earlier in our organizational history, fails to convey our uncertainty about the impact of these programs. It also doesn’t indicate that our research involves forming best guesses based on limited information, and that we are always open to changing our minds. The organizations listed below may be doing good work; we do not have sufficient information to be confident about them, and the information referenced in this post may be out of date. We’ve been researching and funding organizations since 2007 and now devote more than 50,000 hours each year to that research. Based on that research, we recommend a small number of organizations, our top charities, that do a tremendous amount of good.

Normally, we focus on identifying outstanding charities, and minimize the time spent on opaque or otherwise lackluster ones. But lately, we’ve gone into a bit more detail about our take on several of the best-known and most appealing charities out there.

What all of the charities below have in common is that (a) we have major questions and concerns about their activities; (b) the information necessary to see how serious these concerns are does not seem to be available. (In most cases our assessment is based on significant back-and-forth with the charities themselves, though in some cases we are going off their website.)

We think the above charities are fairly representative of “average” charities in international aid. Some tell better stories than others and some have more disclosure than others. But in almost all cases, international aid charities are (a) carrying out complex projects that can fail to do good (or even do harm) in a variety of ways, and (b) not systematically sharing the information that would make it possible to assess how their work is going.

GiveWell is devoted to finding charities in which we can have more confidence. We’ll be discussing our two top-rated charities working internationally in forthcoming posts.