The GiveWell Blog

Incentives for microfinance charities

(updated on: ) | by Holden

I’m very concerned about the incentives for microfinance charities. As I see it, these are the things that they are “rewarded” for:

We feel strongly that there are many more questions a microfinance institution must answer to give an idea of whether it is helping people, and worth donating to. And in theory, many others feel this as well. But looking around MixMarket shows how much more attention the “scale and profits” indicators are getting as of today.

  • The frontpage cites “1,678 total MFIs reporting data” (and we have collected the data, which is overwhelmingly complete on the financial indicators front, for the 268 members of U.S. networks). Yet only 66 institutions have filed social performance reports.
  • The independent ratings found on MixMarket also seem overwhelmingly focused on issues of scale and potential profitability, as opposed to social impact (for a representative example, see the Microrate documents at WISDOM’s profile).

The bottom line? It looks to us like all of the pressure that these institutions face is to maximize scale and profits, without much eye to making sure that they’re improving clients’ lives. And that could explain some eye-popping quotes from publicly available surveys of microfinance dropouts (full documents available at that link; emphasis ours below).

  • “At the end of the meeting the research team watched the process of one group being pressured to complete payment. They were told that they should not leave the meeting until the money was paid. There was heated discussion among them, with members telling each other to contribute, and denying that they themselves had the money with which to contribute. There was Ush. 8,000 missing. Finally a man from another five person group provided the missing money. He told the team that he would probably get the money back from the defaulter (who was not present) and that the defaulter would ‘probably buy him a soda’.” (Uganda report pg 13)
  • “The research team also found one instance where one MFI had started operations in a poor area, issued loans, experienced quite widespread problems with loan repayment and decided to withdraw the programme in its entirety. This resulted in many people’s savings being attached to repay the outstanding loans of others, and the MFI left behind a fair degree of chaos and bad feeling.” (Uganda report pg 13)
  • “the treasurer said that the group’s monthly repayment (Tsh. 300,000) that was to be deposited in SEDA account had been stolen. Two days later the treasurer got very sick; he was bewitched by some of the group members. However after seeing a witchdoctor he recovered. We took him to the Ward Executive Officer; who forced him to repay the money in instalments. He did repay the money but then he was forced to leave Arusha town completely. If he had continued to stay they would have killed him through witchcraft. I lost Tsh. 4,000 through the ROSCA.” (Tanzania report pg 10)
  • “Most MFI’s in Kenya have a very strong emphasis on credit but some are getting into the position where clients are virtually forced to take loans. This is partly because of the MFI’s needs to pump out loans to achieve operational sustainability and partly due to a belief that loans are good for small entrepreneurs – even if they don’t want them!” (Kenya report pg 7)
  • “One of the key determinants of drop-out, often lost in the category ‘failure to repay loan’ by these studies, is the insistence by field staff that clients take loans. Irrespective of what official Head Office policy says, there is a clear understanding among most field staff that they should push out loans – often with little care for whether the clients need or can use them… Matin (1998) also notes, ‘MFI lending technology is insensitive to variations in household conditions. Most MFIs put all households on a treadmill of continuously increasing loan size and insist on a fixed repayment schedule.’” (Bangladesh report pgs 3-4)

You can’t take the “repayment rate” at face value

(updated on: ) | by Holden

We’ve written before about problems with the way a microfinance institution’s “repayment rate” is commonly cited. We’ve been surprised to find that most institutions do not report what most of us would think of as a “repayment rate,” i.e., the percentage of loans/dollars due that have been paid on time. Instead, they report proxies such as “portfolio at risk” that can (theoretically) be very different.

We now have an example of just how different they can be. ID-Ghana, a microfinance institution, has given us permission to post its application for funding from GiveWell. Page 2 discloses that “The write-off ratio has shot up lately because of the clean up that followed the phase out of our old loan products which proved to be inefficient and impactless,” yet the repayment ratio is reported as 99% (same paragraph). That’s because the definition of “repayment ratio” being used ignores loans that have been defaulted on and written off. Only “at-risk” (but still-on-the-books) loans lower this “repayment ratio.”

These charts show how drastic the disrepancy is, particularly from June 2009 on:

To be clear, we think ID-Ghana’s reporting is entirely consistent with standard reporting practices. To a large degree, that’s what worries us. By industry standard reporting practices, a 99% “repayment ratio” can be consistent with a 30%+ default rate – and is in this case.

This is why we’ve insisted on requesting what we call the “real repayment rate”, defined as the percentage of loans that have been paid off on time divided by the percentage of loans that have come due over a given time period (“loans” here can refer to number of loans or dollars lent).

What has shocked us is how few microfinance institutions are able to provide the real repayment rate. In fact, all of the major U.S. microfinance institutions we’ve contacted (excluding FINCA, which declined to apply for funding at all) have explicitly told us that they cannot or will not provide real repayment rates for their partners.

We’ll be writing more about the Small Enterprise Foundation, the only institution that we’ve seen be fully clear about its repayment rate.

Is borrowing good for the borrowers?

(updated on: ) | by Holden

Just because someone is repaying their loans doesn’t mean they’re benefiting from the loans.

We have given some conceptual/anecdotal support for this idea in the past, linking to David Roodman’s posts on possible “overlending” and comparing microloans to payday loans. Lately we’ve been investigating something a bit more concrete: how often, and why, do microfinance clients “drop out” of microlending programs?

The basic idea is that a client could repay a loan due to pressure (from their “lending group” or the microfinance institution), making sacrifices or borrowing from elsewhere (such as moneylenders) to do so. We would expect such clients to show up as “repayers” while not necessarily staying in the program for more loans.

Our observations (details and full sources below):

  • Dropout rates appear substantial, averaging 28% and often exceeding 40%, among institutions that publicly report them (via MixMarket).
  • Survey data on why clients drop out is limited, but what we’ve seen suggests that “graduation” (i.e., moving to better sources of credit or no longer needing credit) is not a common reason for dropping out. Business failure and dissatisfaction with the group/staff/institution are common reasons.
  • A high dropout rate can be consistent with reasonably good reported client satisfaction.

Dropout rates

We have gone through all microfinance institutions that report “social performance reports” on MixMarket (you can see the complete list of institutions, with their publicly posted reports, at MixMarket’s social performance report section) and collected the data into this spreadsheet (XLS). (Note that dropout rates are not on the list of “standard” indicators and are not reported by all MixMarket participants, but are included in “social performance reports.”) Here’s a summary of the 60 institutions that report dropout rates:

Dropout rate range # institutions
Exactly 0% 3
0% to 5% 7
5% to 10% 4
10% to 20% 10
20% to 40% 23
40% to 60% 12
60% to 80% 1
80% to 100% 0

Taking the average across all 60, weighted by number of clients, yields an “average” dropout rate of 28%. Details here (XLS). That implies that in a given year, 28 out of 100 clients become non-clients (see the “social performance reports” for the details of the calculation).

Reasons for dropping out

We don’t know of any comprehensive studies of the reasons clients drop out, but in the process of searching for an outstanding microfinance institution, we have encountered several small-scale surveys. We have posted the non-confidential dropout surveys along with a summary in Excel, and hope to clear a couple more in the future (they are broadly consistent with the summary below).

The Bangladesh study specifically states that “One of the reasons that is notable by its almost complete absence from these listings of grounds for drop-out is ‘graduation’” (pg 4). The rest of the studies give the same picture: “graduation” (i.e., the idea that clients now no longer need microfinance because they can access better sources of credit and/or do not need credit) is not cited as a significant factor in any of them, except in the Uganda study (which does not state how common this factor is, but cites it as a factor specifically for “Relatively Well-off drop-outs” (pg iii)).

Business failure is a commonly cited factor (37-58% of clients cite this factor, in the studies that report numbers – see Excel summary). Issues with the “lending group,” the organization or its staff are the other most common factors. The Tanzania study cites “The inability of clients to cope with the rigid MFI policies and procedures” (pg 9) and also vividly describes a group conflict in which the treasurer claimed funds had been stolen (pg 10). The Bangladesh study states that “One of the key determinants of drop-out … is the insistence by field staff that clients take loans” (pg 3-4).

Client satisfaction

The LAPO study (see previous discussion of LAPO, Kiva’s largest partner) looks not only at the reasons for dropping out, but at overall reported client satisfaction.

The former figures seem cause for concern: there is a dropout rate of around 25% (estimated from graph on pg 7) and reasons given include “poor business performance” (applying to 24.2% of dropouts), “Burden of paying for others who had defaulted” (29.5%), and “the attitude of some staff” (cited as a major factor but without quantification). But overall, reported satisfaction looks reasonably strong:


(Note that the repeating of “Didn’t help me at all” is found in the original table.)

We feel these numbers should be taken with a grain of salt, since it seems possible to us that clients could have felt pressure to report positive experiences. But the numbers do serve as a reminder that microfinance institutions have many clients who are (apparently) happy repeat customers.

Bottom line

Most microfinance institutions don’t appear to publicly report dropout rates, much less the reasons for dropping out (this observation based on the small percentage of MixMarket participants who have shared social performance reports). Those that do are likely to have more encouraging numbers than the others, and yet their numbers seem to leave substantial room for concern. Clients seem to drop out, for overwhelmingly negative reasons, at rates averaging 28% and often exceeding 40%.

We don’t mean to overfocus on the negative here. Microfinance institutions could be providing valuable services for many people, and we wouldn’t want donors to stay away from an activity that’s doing good overall even if it is doing damage to some.

But it does seem that the more we dig through the information on microfinance, the less it resembles the stories commonly told about it. Making loans can do good or harm. We feel strongly that people donating money to microfinance institutions should be asking for substantial due diligence – not anecdotes and pictures, and not the commonly cited, misleading metrics like “repayment rate,” but systematically collected information that gets at services’ actual impact on clients.

Orphanages

(updated on: ) | by Holden

We haven’t done much work on charities that try to help orphans and vulnerable children, and we intend to do more. Here are some preliminary thoughts, though.

At first glance, this area might seem among the simplest and least controversial. SOS Children’s Villages states, “Our sponsors and donors help children whose parents are not there for them. They may be AIDS orphans, street children, child soldiers or children orphaned by war, poverty or natural disasters. We give these children a mother and a family in a home within an SOS Children’s Village. Donations pay to build the Villages and run them until child sponsors cover the running costs.” Could any sort of “impact evaluation” be helpful here? How can one deny that children without homes should be provided homes if at all possible?

However, the picture becomes far more complex upon reading something like Saundra Schimmelpfennig’s series on orphanages.

  • Donor demand for funding orphanages may be outstripping actual need (we have speculated that cleft surgery and microcredit may face similar issues).
  • Many of the children in orphanages are not actually orphans. Parents may send them there because they find caring for them to be too expensive; orphanages may weaken the incentives for children’s other relatives and community members to take them in.
  • If, in fact, orphanages are one option rather than the only option for care, it becomes much more crucial to determine whether they are providing good conditions for children. Ms. Schimmelpfennig raises questions about this issue.
  • There is an ongoing debate in academia about whether abandoned children are better off in institutions or being cared for by relatives/community. One person with field experience told me he personally saw a situation in which he believed that orphanages were actively making the situation worse, and Ms. Schimmelpfennig’s series also implies that this is a serious possibility.

None of this means that donating to orphanages is a bad idea. What it means is that, as usual, the appealing story you see on a charity’s website has a great deal of complexity and open questions behind it. As usual, it is essential to ask critical questions, and not to let your due diligence end with “That sounds like a clear need.”

Smile Train in its own words

(updated on: ) | by Holden

We recently argued that Smile Train has “more dollars than doctors” for its core program. In that light, yesterday’s Virginian-Pilot article (which quotes me) is interesting:

  • The main story is that Smile Train has been trying to make substantial and unrestricted grants to another major cleft surgery charity, Operation Smile. This despite the fact that Smile Train has in the past raised concerns about Operation Smile (“intentionally fabricated tens of thousand of surgeries… distorted its financial reporting… squandered millions of dollars… provided shoddy medical care….”)
  • The story quotes Smile Train’s President as appearing to explicitly support the “more dollars than doctors” idea: “Smile Train focused on funding operations by doctors in the countries in need … Mullaney concedes, though, that in some countries, such as Somalia and Haiti, the need outstrips the number of surgeons available to do the work.”

It’s hard to make sense of Smile Train’s wish to make unrestricted grants to Operation Smile, except by accepting that Smile Train is out of room for more funding in its core program.

Possibly, Smile Train’s concerns about Operation Smile have been addressed. Arguably, the decision to grant extra funds to other organizations is admirable (we don’t know whether other charities respond to the same situation by simply piling up assets). But it certainly seems difficult to argue that Smile Train’s donors should think of themselves as funding more of the “$250 per surgery” core program.

Going deeper on “room for more funding”: Underfunded grant proposals

(updated on: ) | by Holden

We previously discussed some simple ways to get at the difficult question of “room for more funding.” One approach that has been more difficult than expected is asking charities themselves to help figure out where more funds are likely to go – answers tend to be vague and tend to target what the charities think we want to hear. How to get specific, concrete, and credible info?

One approach can work specifically for grantmaking charities, i.e., charities that pool donations and make large grants to other organizations. Grantmaking charities are more common than you might think in international aid – arguably any large organization like UNICEF or CARE can be thought of as making grants from its central office to its many projects around the world.

The question we ask such charities is: Can you share examples of strong grant proposals that went underfunded – or rejected – because of insufficient funds?

This is a very different request from asking for rejected grant proposals. An organization may be funding a small percentage of grant proposals, while still funding all reasonable ones. However, an organization that can show proposals that are both strong and underfunded is making a strong case that it has room for more funding.

The Against Malaria Foundation, our 3rd-ranked international aid charity, gave a stellar response to this request. At its GiveWell review, you can see both approved and rejected proposals, and it seems fairly clear that funds are indeed the bottleneck to approving distribution of more insecticide-treated nets.

Asking for a grantmaking organization’s “best unfunded grant proposals” is a pretty simple idea. But you won’t see it requested in any tax return, included in any online charity information database, or mentioned in any of the various impact/outcomes frameworks that various nonprofit sector actors are putting together. Evidence that the “room for more funding” question is largely neglected as of today.