The GiveWell Blog

How to help GiveWell

We often get the question, “how can I most help GiveWell?”

First and foremost, you can donate to our top charities. Giving to our top charities accomplishes good directly, but it also really helps GiveWell too (as long as we know about your gift). You may not have much to give, but by giving what you can, you’re helping GiveWell commensurate with your resources.

Second, you can spread the word about GiveWell. You can introduce your friends to effective altruism and point them to helpful starting points like Peter Singer’s book The Life You Can Save, his recent TED talk, or our Giving 101.

You can also like/share our Facebook posts with your network or re-tweet what we post on Twitter. Looking out for opportunities to share interesting things we write with your network will really help us.

Third, if you have time, you can use it to help us. You can help most by reading the content we put out and letting us know — via blog comments or emailing our public email list — if you have questions, comments, or concerns. We work hard to make our research available to everyone and we really appreciate active engagement from our audience.

Alternatively, if you have a blog or other audience of your own, we always really appreciate when others discuss the work we’re doing. The best way to view all the content we’re publishing is our newly published materials list, which you can follow via email, RSS, or Twitter.

In very rare cases, we’re open to working with volunteers or even hiring people as full-time staff. If you’re passionate about what we do, and have specific skills or interests that could help us, let us know by following the instructions on our jobs page.

Meta-research update

As mentioned previously, we are currently conducting an in-depth investigation of meta-research, with the hopes of producing our first “medium-depth” report on the giving opportunities in a cause.

Our investigation isn’t yet complete, but it has taken several turns that we’ve found educational, and our vision of what it means to investigate a “cause” has evolved. This post gives an update on how we’ve gone from “investigating meta-research in general, starting with development economics” to “specifically investigating the issue of reproducibility in medical research” to “investigating alternatives to the traditional journal system.”

The big-picture takeaway is that if one defines a “cause” the way we did previously – as “a particular set of problems, or opportunities, such that the people and organizations working on them are likely to interact with each other, and such that evaluating many of these people and organizations requires knowledge of overlapping subjects” – then it can be difficult to predict exactly what will turn out to be a “cause” and what won’t. We started by articulating a broad topic – a seeming disconnect between the incentives academics face and the incentives that would be in line with producing work of maximal benefit to society – and looking for people and organizations who do work related to this topic, but found that this topic breaks down into many sub-topics that are a better match for the concept of a “cause.”

Simply identifying which sub-topics can be approached as “causes” is non-trivial. We believe it is important to do so, if one wishes to deliberately focus in on the most promising causes that can be understood in a reasonable time frame, rather than spreading one’s investigative resources exploring several causes at once.

From development economics to medicine

In a previous meta-research update, we focused on the field of development economics. Following that update, we collaborated for several months with an institutional funder that supports a significant amount of development economics work and has expressed similar “meta-research” interests; we also explored some other fields, as discussed in a recent post. We ultimately came to the working conclusion that

  • Meta-research in medicine-related fields is “further along” than in social sciences, in the sense that there are more established organizations and infrastructure around meta-research (for example, Cochrane Collaboration and EQUATOR network) and there has been more research on related issues (particularly the work of John Ioannidis).
  • With that said, meta-research in medicine-related fields still has a long enough way to go – and little enough in the way of existing funders working on it – to make it a potentially promising area.
  • In social sciences, studies are often so expensive and lengthy to conduct (the deworming study we’ve discussed before took over a decade to produce what we consider its most relevant results) that the prospects for robustly establishing conclusions to inform policy generally seem distant. By contrast, we believe that improving the reliability of medical research would likely have fairly direct and quick impacts on medical practice.
  • The institutional funder we have collaborated with continues to work in social sciences (specifically development economics), and we believe its approach and attitude is similar enough to ours that our value-added in this area would be limited.

With these points in mind, we decided to shift our focus and deeply investigate meta-research in medicine-related fields rather than meta-research in development economics. This was a provisional decision; we remain interested in the latter.

Exploring meta-research in medicine

Alexander Berger led an investigation of meta-research in medicine, beginning in February. His basic approach was to start with the leads we had – contacts at Cochrane as well as individuals suggested by John Ioannidis – and get referrals from them to other people he should be speaking with.

In early May, we paused the investigation to take stock of where we were. It occurred to us that the people and organizations we had come across were divided into a few categories, which didn’t necessarily overlap:

1. The “efficiency and integrity of medical research” community. This community focuses on improving the efficiency with which medical research funding is translated into reliable, actionable evidence, by promoting practices such as (a) systematic reviews, which synthesize many studies to provide overall conclusions that can inform medical practitioners; (b) data sharing, especially of clinical trial data; (c) preregistration; and (d) replications of existing studies to check their reliability. This community includes the Cochrane Collaboration.

People in this community that we spoke to include:

2. The “open science” community. This community focuses on new tools for producing, sharing, reviewing, and evaluating research, many of them focusing on the idea of a transition from traditional paper journals to more powerful and flexible online applications. Some such tools (such as Open Science Framework) are produced by nonprofits, while others (such as ResearchGate and JournalLab) are produced by for-profits.

People in this community that we spoke to include:

Widespread adoption of tools such as those listed above could eventually make it much easier for researchers to share their data, check the reliability of each others’ work, and synthesize all existing research on a given question – in other words, such adoption could eventually lead to resolution of many of the same issues that the “efficiency of medical research” community deals with. Not surprisingly, many of the people in the “open science” community emphasize the same problems with today’s research world that people in the “efficiency of medical research” community emphasize – so it’s not surprising that, when we expressed interest in these issues, we were pointed to people in both categories.

That said, there is little overlap between communities #1 and #2, and we believe that this is largely for good reason. Community #1 focuses on medical research; community #2 is generally working across many fields at once. Community #1 focuses on actions that could directly and quickly improve the usability of medical research; community #2 is largely working on a longer time horizon, and hopes to see dramatic improvements when widespread adoption of its tools takes place. (Despite this, when there are organizations that have a disciplinary bent, we’ve continued to focus on the more bio-medically relevant ones, as opposed to those focused on, e.g. astronomy or geosciences.)

3. Other communities. Some other communities that could fall under the heading of “meta-research relevant to medical practice” include:

  • The evidence-based medicine community, which seeks to improve the usefulness of evidence for medical practice by increasing the extent to which available high-quality evidence is used in medical practice. (We see this community as distinct from the “efficiency and integrity of biomedical research” community because it focuses on the use, as opposed to the production, of evidence, though many of the practitioners overlap.)
  • People seeking to improve the practice of epidemiology (whose methods and issues are quite distinct from those of the sort of research that Cochrane Collaboration synthesizes). One such group is the Observational Medical Outcomes Partnership (OMOP), which we spoke with David Madigan about.
  • John Ioannidis, whose work seems largely unique as far as we can tell. Prof. Ioannidis has studied a wide variety of “meta-research” issues in a wide variety of fields, including reproducibility of clinical research, bias, reliability of genome-wide association studies, and conformity vs. creativity in biology research.
  • Vannevar, a group started by Dario Amodei (who is a GiveWell fan and personal friend), which aims to improve the infrastructure around fields such as basic biology (which is distinct from both epidemiology and the sort of medical research that the Cochrane Collaboration addresses) and machine learning. Unlike most of the groups discussed above, Vannevar is focused on improving the ability of academia to produce high-risk, revolutionary work, rather than on improving its ability to efficiently produce immediately actionable recommendations for medical practitioners and policymakers.

Many of the individuals working in these communities may have cross-cutting interests and play some role in multiple communities, but we see the communities as having discrete identities. The characterization above is not meant to be exhaustive or to eliminate the possibility of other groupings, but rather to convey our understanding of the relationships between various problems, interventions, and individuals.

The path from here

At this point, the community we feel we have covered the most thoroughly is #2, the “open science” community. This hasn’t been an entirely deliberate decision: we’ve spoken to the people we’ve been pointed to and the people they’ve pointed us to, and only after many conversations have we noticed the patterns and distinct communities discussed above.

Because it is important to us to complete a medium-depth writeup, we’re currently aiming to complete such a writeup on open science. We will add the other communities discussed above to our list of potential shallow investigations.

In this process, we’ve learned that it can take a fair amount of work and reflection just to determine what counts as a “cause” in the relevant way. We think such work and reflection is worthwhile. Rather than speaking to everyone who is somehow connected to a problem of interest, we seek to identify different causes, deliberately pick the ones we want to focus in on, and cover those thoroughly.

Refining the goals of GiveWell Labs

[Added August 27, 2014: GiveWell Labs is now known as the Open Philanthropy Project.]

To date, our work on GiveWell Labs has been highly exploratory and preliminary, but we’ve recently been refining our picture of what we expect our output to look like in the reasonably near (~1 year) future. Our plans are still tentative, but have changed enough that an update seems worthwhile at this stage.

In brief,

  • Our main goal is to find the most promising charitable causes; we think of the “cause,” rather than the “charity” or “project,” as the most relevant unit of analysis for us at this point.
  • We expect to recommend causes that combine high potential for impact with low existing philanthropic resources.
  • We currently work closely with Good Ventures on this research. Cari Tuna is an active partner with us on these investigations, and we see Good Ventures as the initial target for our recommendations. Both GiveWell and Good Ventures anticipate other philanthropists (including some portion of GiveWell’s existing audience of individual donors) eventually participating in funding the opportunities we identify.
  • We expect to investigate potential cause recommendations for a substantial amount of time before releasing recommendations, but we are not holding ourselves to conducting a “comprehensive” investigation before releasing recommendations. At some point in the future, we will recommend causes based on the information we’ve gained so far, while continuing to explore more. This approach mirrors the approach we’ve taken in the past with charity recommendations: taking some time up front, releasing recommendations, then continuing to seek better recommendations even as we promote our existing ones.
  • For the near future, we will focus on exploring causes at limited depth, in order to identify the most promising ones. We are planning to explore many causes at the “shallow” level (~20 hours), and a smaller number of causes at a deeper level (~3 months, with the investigation outsourced to a contractor when possible). The causes we explore at a deep level will be based on the causes we find most promising at a given point in time.

Note that we continue to collaborate closely with Good Ventures on our work in these areas, which constitute a largely shared agenda, and “we” generally refers to “GiveWell and Good Ventures” in this post.

Details follow.

Charitable cause as fundamental unit of analysis
When GiveWell started, it focused on finding the best charities by certain criteria. These criteria were particularly well-suited to looking across a broad array of charitable causes: we weren’t sure yet what types of interventions we found most promising, but for any given charity we could ask whether it had room for more funding to carry out activities with established and quantifiable likely outcomes.

When we first launched GiveWell Labs, we shifted to the idea of finding the best projects. We had realized that many charities are extremely diverse organizations, and many philanthropic opportunities involve funding particular parts of them. (A particularly extreme case might be that of a university, whose professors could be funded to do promising research but which we wouldn’t want to provide unrestricted support to). We laid out a set of criteria for such projects.

However, we’ve since moved to the cause as our fundamental unit of analysis. We’d roughly define a “cause” as “a particular set of problems, or opportunities, such that the people and organizations working on them are likely to interact with each other, and such that evaluating many of these people and organizations requires knowledge of overlapping subjects.”

Some reasons for this shift include:

  • It’s generally very difficult to evaluate a project in isolation from knowledge of the cause it sits within.
    • Even for the most “proven” interventions we’ve been able to find – such as bednet distribution – we’ve put in a great deal of work to understand the nuances of the evidence base and the funding landscape, and we now feel better positioned to assess other ideas that touch on these areas (for example, funding of research on insecticide resistance).
    • An instructive experience was when, last year, we sought to evaluate the Cochrane Collaboration, whose work we were already highly familiar with. Even to get a basic sense of its situation, we felt it necessary to do a miniature survey of the funding landscape, and doing so increased our interest in and understanding of meta-research for biomedical sciences. After this survey, we felt better positioned to understand funding opportunities in this area than in most others, which is why we prioritized it as our first medium-depth cause investigation (more on this in a future post).
    • In trying to evaluate giving opportunities in unfamiliar areas – whether brought to us by individuals, charities or foundations – we’ve found that our assessments are highly volatile and tend to change rapidly with new information, making it hard to form confidence without getting a better sense of the cause-level issues.
    • In particular, when evaluating a giving opportunity, we feel it’s important to have a sense of who the other funders are in the relevant space, and what sorts of projects they are and aren’t interested in.
  • We’ve also come to the view that committing to a cause can be necessary in order to find giving opportunities within that cause. At this point, we don’t think one can take the lack of “shovel-ready” projects within a cause as a sign that the cause doesn’t have room for more funding. More at a previous post on active vs. passive funding.
  • Between the above points, it seems to us that it may be appropriate to make a several-year commitment to a cause, in order to form the appropriate relationships, source giving opportunities, try different approaches and learn from them, etc. In speaking with foundations, we’ve generally gotten the sense that their approaches to the causes they’ve focused on have changed dramatically over time.
  • Another major input into our thinking has been the fact that nearly every major foundation (some of which we find impressive) seems to approach giving from this basic perspective, i.e., focusing on particular causes.

We do believe there are potential ways to give well without taking a “cause-focused” approach. These may include

  • Focusing on interventions with strong formal evidence of effectiveness regardless of cause, as GiveWell has for most of its history. Our take at this point is that such interventions are rare, and such a focus largely ends up leading to a focus on causes within global health and nutrition.
  • Focusing on finding and funding outstanding people. I believe that this approach can be very effective when one uses one’s own network (and thus effectively trades deep knowledge of causes for deep knowledge of people), but that it’s more difficult to carry out such an approach with scale and systematicity. Funders aiming to do the latter include Ashoka, Echoing Green, Draper Richards Kaplan, and the Skoll Foundation.
  • Funding prominent organizations and individuals whose prominence makes it relatively easy to assess them (e.g., by triangulating others’ opinions).

Our anticipated approach to making cause recommendations
Our tentative basic approach to recommending causes is continuous with the approach we’ve previously taken to recommending charities:

  • We seek to cast a wide net, considering many options. At the same time, we focus our resources on the options that seem most promising.
  • We will be asking a set of consistent critical questions of each cause we consider. At this point, these questions are tentatively: “What is the problem?”, “What are possible interventions?” and “Who else is working on it?”, and we are looking for causes where the philanthropic funding and presence are unusually low relative to the importance, tractability, and opportunities around the problem(s) in question.
  • We expect the answers to these questions to involve judgment calls, and we aim to be transparent about such judgment calls.
  • We seek to release recommendations at the point where we (a) have put substantial time into research, and (b) feel that our recommendations are highly likely to be better than what our audience can come up with on its own.
  • We do not seek perfect or comprehensive knowledge, preferring to issue recommendations once they’ve crossed a certain threshold of thoroughness and then continue to refine them over time. Early recommendations may have some element of arbitrariness in them (e.g., being sensitive to what we chose to prioritize), and we expect recommendations to become more systematically grounded over time.

In the past, this approach has applied to recommended charities; at this point, we tentatively anticipate applying it to charitable causes. While we aren’t yet ready to set a deadline, we hope that we will have recommendations as soon as possible regarding which charitable causes are most promising for a major philanthropist to invest in. We expect to recommend to major philanthropists that they consider hiring specialized staff to explore these causes.

Cause investigations that are completed or in progress
Our work on GiveWell Labs can broadly be divided into:

  • Lower-depth investigations. So far we have published 3 of these, and they are available here. We have examined climate change, international migration (report forthcoming), promotion of in-country migration, and detection of near-earth asteroids. Some investigations have taken relatively little time (in the range of 20 person-hours) while some have taken substantially longer (getting a basic feel for the climate change literature took a significant investment).In all cases, we’ve sought to get a basic sense of (a) the significance of the problem to be addressed; (b) broad possible avenues of intervention; (c) who else is working in this area. By collecting this basic information for many causes, we hope to be able to identify the ones that have a particularly strong combination of humanitarian significance, tractability, and “room for more philanthropy” (i.e., being under-invested in relative to other causes). We feel that most of the time we’ve spent on these investigations has been necessary to produce a basic understanding of these issues, and that it would take much more time to gain high confidence or gain a strong sense of the specific giving opportunities that are out there.
  • Higher-depth investigations. We are currently working on a higher-depth investigation of a particular sub-field of meta-research. The investigation has involved a large number of conversations and, unlike the lower-depth investigations, is aiming to give us a fairly clear sense of what the major players and the giving opportunities in this space look like. It is difficult to say how much longer this investigation will take; when it is complete, we hope it will become a template for future high-depth investigations, which we may look for contractors (e.g., subject matter experts) to work on.
  • Cross-cutting projects intended to put us in better position to look at large numbers of causes. These include our work on understanding the basics of scientific research and political advocacy (which we will write more about in the future), our work on history of philanthropy, and co-funding work.

So far, we have not prioritized areas solely on the basis of how promising they seem: we’ve also factored in how prepared we felt to investigate them, given our existing background knowledge. For example, as mentioned above, we felt that we were better grounded in the issues around meta-research than in most issues, so we chose this area for our first high-depth investigation. As we develop a better sense of what these investigations involve, such considerations will become less of a factor.

Our plan for conducting more cause investigations
Alexander Berger has, so far, led both the lower-depth and higher-depth investigations. He will continue conducting lower-depth investigations, hoping for an average of about one completed report per month, with output hopefully rising as we bring on more staff later this year.

When it comes to higher-depth investigations, we are hoping to try outsourcing these investigations to contract researchers. We are planning to produce a meta-research writeup that can serve as a fairly concrete template for what we’re looking for, and we believe it’s possible that a contract researcher – perhaps a subject-matter expert in the relevant field, perhaps a consulting firm that has done this sort of work for other foundations – can create a similar writeup for other causes.

We expect finding such contractors to be challenging, and we expect working with such contractors to involve significant investment on our part in terms of specifying what we’re looking for and managing the process. For this reason, we’re not currently seeking to outsource our lower-depth investigations in the same way; we’d need a good deal of output to justify the investment we expect to make. Also for this reason, we’re hoping to begin experimenting with contractors soon, rather than waiting until we’re confident in which causes are most worth exploring at greater depth.

All of the above plans are tentative; we plan to move forward as outlined and change course if/when it makes sense to do so.

Possible global catastrophic risks

I previously discussed our view that in general, further economic development and general human empowerment are likely to be substantially net positive, and are likely to lead to improvement on many dimensions in unexpected ways. In my view, the most worrying counterpoint to this view is the possibility of global catastrophic risks. Broadly speaking, while increasing interconnectedness and power over our environment seem to have many good consequences, these things may also put us at greater risk for a major catastrophe – one that affects the entire world (or a large portion of it) and threatens to reverse, halt, or substantially slow the ongoing global progress in living standards.

This post lists the most worrying global catastrophic risks that I’m aware of, and briefly discusses the role that further technological and economic development could play in exacerbating – or mitigating – them. A future post will discuss how I think about the overall contribution of economic/technological development to exacerbating/mitigating global catastrophic risks in general (including risks that aren’t salient today). The purpose of this post is to (a) continue fleshing out the broad view that further economic development and general human empowerment are likely to be substantially net positive, which is one of the deep value judgments and worldview characteristics underlying our approach to giving recommendations; (b) catalogue some possible candidates for philanthropic focus areas (under the theory that major global catastrophic risks are potentially promising areas for philanthropy to address).

Possible global catastrophic risks that I’m aware of
I consider the following to be the most worrying possibilities I’m aware of for reversing, halting, or substantially slowing the ongoing global progress in living standards. There are likely many such risks I’m not aware of, and likely many such risks that essentially no one today is aware of. I hope that readers of this post will mention important possibilities that I’ve neglected in the comments.

In general, I’m trying to list factors that could do not just large damage, but the kind of damage that could create an unprecedented global challenge.

  1. More powerful technology – particularly in areas such as nuclear weapons, biological weapons, and artificial intelligence – may make wars, terrorist acts, and accidents more dangerous. Further technological progress is likely to lead to technology with far more potential to do damage. Somewhat offsetting this, technological and economic progress may also lead to improved security measures and lower risks of war and terrorism.
  2. A natural pandemic may cause unprecedented damage, perhaps assisted by the development of resistance to today’s common antibiotics. On this front I see technological and economic development as mostly risk-reducing, via the development of better surveillance systems, better antibiotics, better systems for predicting/understanding/responding to pandemics, etc.
  3. Climate change may lead to a major humanitarian crisis (such as unprecedented numbers of refugees due to sea level rise) or to other unanticipated consequences. Economic development may speed this danger by increasing the global rate of CO2 emissions; economic and technological development may mitigate this danger via the development of better energy sources (as well as energy storage and grid systems and other technology for more efficiently using energy), as well as greater wealth leading to more interest in – and perceived ability to afford – emissions reduction.
  4. Technological and economic progress could slow or stop due to a failure to keep innovating at a sufficient rate. Gradual growth in living standards has been the norm for a long time, and a prolonged stagnation could cause unanticipated problems (e.g., values could change significantly if people don’t perceive living standards as continuing to rise).
  5. Global economic growth could become bottlenecked by a scarcity of a particular resource (the most commonly mentioned concern along these lines is “peak oil,” but I have also heard concerns about supplies of food and of water for irrigation). Technological and economic progress could worsen this risk by speeding our consumption of a key resource, or could mitigate it by leading to the development of better technologies for finding and extracting resources and/or effective alternatives to such resources.
  6. An asteroid, supervolcano or solar flare could cause unprecedented damage. Here I largely see economic and technological progress as risk-reducing factors, as they may give us better tools for predicting, preventing and/or mitigating damage from such natural disasters.
  7. An oppressive government may gain power over a substantial part of the world. Technological progress could worsen this risk by improving the tools of such a government to wage war and monitor and control citizens; technological and economic progress could mitigate this risk by strengthening others’ abilities to defend themselves.

I should note that I perceive the odds of complete human extinction from any of the above factors, over the next hundred years or so, to be quite low. #1 would require the development of weapons with destructive potential far in excess of anything that exists today, plus the deployment of such weapons either by superpowers (which seems unlikely if they hold the potential for destroying the human race) or by rogue states/individuals (which seems unlikely since rogue states/individuals don’t have much recent track record of successfully obtaining and deploying the world’s most powerful weapons). #2 would require a disease to emerge with a historically unusual combination of propensity-to-kill and propensity-to-spread. And in either case, the odds of killing all people – taking into account the protected refuges that many governments likely have in place and the substantial number of people who live in remote areas – seem substantially less than the odds of killing many people. We have looked into #3 and and parts of #6 to some degree, and currently believe that there are no particularly likely-seeming scenarios with risk of human extinction.

Global upside possibilities
In addition to global catastrophic risks, there are what I call “global upside possibilities.” That is, future developments may lead to extremely dramatic improvements in quality and quantity of life, and in the robustness of civilization to catastrophic risks. Broadly speaking, these may include

  • Massive reduction or elimination of poverty.
  • Massive improvements in quality of life for the non-poor.
  • Improved intelligence, wisdom, and propensity for making good decisions across society.
  • Increased interconnectedness, empathy and altruism.
  • Space colonization or other developments leading to lowered potential consequences of global catastrophic risks.

I feel that humanity’s future may end up being massively better than its past, and unexpected new developments (particularly technological innovation) may move us toward such a future with surprising speed. Quantifying just how much better such a future would be does not strike me as a very useful exercise, but very broadly, it’s easy for me to imagine a possible future that is at least as desirable as human extinction is undesirable. In other words, if I somehow knew that economic and technological development were equally likely to lead to human extinction or to a brighter long-term future, it’s easy for me to imagine that I could still prefer such development to stagnation.

I see technological and economic development as essential to raising the odds of reaching a much brighter long-term future, and I see such a future as being much less vulnerable to global catastrophic risks than today’s world. I believe that any discussion of technological/economic development global catastrophic risks (and the role of technological/economic development in such risks) is incomplete if it leaves out this consideration.

A future post will discuss how I think about the overall contribution of economic/technological development to our odds of having a very bright, as opposed to very problematic, future. For now, I’d appreciate comments on any major, broad far-future considerations this post has neglected.

Flow-through effects

As mentioned previously, we believe that further economic development, and general human empowerment, is likely to be substantially net positive, and that it is likely to lead to improvement on many dimensions in unexpected ways. This post elaborates on the reasons we hold this view and the implications of it.

We haven’t done nearly as much empirical research on whether this view is appropriate as we would ideally like to, and in the future we may approach it with a more concerted research effort. For now, we’d point to the following as broad defenses of this view:

  • Since the Industrial Revolution, it appears that quality of life has improved in nearly every measurable way. A simple illustration of this idea comes from a brief recent post we made showing broadly rising per-capita income and falling infant mortality in the developing world. A more thorough discussion is available in chapter 2 of From Poverty to Prosperity by Arnold Kling and Nick Schultz, from which we’ve excerpted the key tables. (Note that this chapter isn’t our “primary source” for this claim; we have picked up various perspectives on this question from GapMinder, general discussions, etc. and point to this chapter merely as a relatively accessible summary.) The Better Angels of Our Nature, a relatively recent book by Steven Pinker, provides a deeper and narrower investigation of the effect of these changes on violence.
  • The developed world appears to be better off than the developing world on nearly every metric we can think of, such as life expectancy and reported happiness, nutritional status (particularly for children), civil rights and human rights, and education (including for women and girls in particular).
  • In the past, there have been many concerns about new technology making the world worse in some way, but these generally don’t seem to have panned out. For example, sulfur dioxide emissions, which cause acid rain, spiked during the mid 20th century in the U.S. but now are at much lower levels, along with most other pollutants in the U.S. Persistent worries about the mass unemployment effects of automation also appear not to have panned out, though they continue to be raised.

    We don’t believe that avoidance of modernity-related problems can be taken for granted. In many cases it may take place because of concerted efforts to improve regulation and societal norms, and such concerted efforts may be needed to deal with various issues today. However, we also think it’s worth noting that concerted efforts to make the world a broadly better place seem to have become more common and more viable as economic development has progressed. Environmentalism, multiple civil rights movements, and large-scale foreign aid are examples of positive social changes that have emerged in the last two centuries and appear stronger in the developed world than in the developing world today. We’d guess that increased wealth and improved technology often improves people’s ability to coordinate around, and concentrate on, movements whose effects go beyond their personal lives.

  • One of the most compelling cases for a way in which development and technology can cause harm revolves around “global catastrophic risks” such as climate change and nuclear war. However, from where we sit today, improved technology and economic development seem at least as likely to play a major role in mitigating these risks (via e.g. cleaner energy sources and more efficient overall economic activity to mitigate climate change, and greater economic interdependence and more effective security to mitigate military threats) as to worsen them. We will write further on this point in the future. It may be true that we would be safer from global catastrophic risks if we had never had any economic/technological development, but a faster rate seems safer than a slower rate from here.

We wish to note that we do not embrace the explanations for improvement sometimes associated with observations such as the ones above, explanations that often focus on the role of free markets to the exclusion of other institutions. We believe much of the improvement we describe may be attributable to the actions of governments, activist movements, and voluntary altruism (including philanthropy) as well as economic exchange. We believe that the exact dynamics by which the world has improved aren’t fully clear. My own take is that the concept of broad market efficiency is important here: as people become wealthier, better informed about each others’ activities, and generally gain more abilities and options, they become more empowered and motivated to tackle problems that they previously wouldn’t have been able to work on (or would have viewed as less pressing than other problems). To give a simple example, whatever good GiveWell does will be creditable partly to the huge number of other world improvements that have (a) given us the wealth and security to start a new venture; (b) given us education and tools to do our investigations; (c) addressed other problems that might have occupied our attention instead; (d) produced technology to run our lives and organization efficiently and find our audience (who themselves have similarly benefited).

If our overall view on this topic is broadly correct, it has some important implications.

First, it implies that a substantial part of the good that one does may be indirect: the people that one helps directly (by e.g. funding distribution of bednets) become more empowered to contribute to society, and this in turn may empower others, etc. If one believes that, on average, people tend to accomplish good when they become more empowered, it’s conceivable that the indirect benefits of one’s giving swamp the first-order effects.

If true, this is yet another source of noise (beyond the many we’ve identified) in formal cost-effectiveness estimates, and another reason not to take these estimates literally. It also implies that helping people who are well-positioned to contribute to society and/or help others is particularly valuable, relative to e.g. simple reduction of suffering for people who are not well-positioned to help others.

Second, it implies that helping to address any problem is a possible path to addressing many other problems. For example, if one’s only goal is to improve women’s education, it’s conceivable that the best option for doing so is to fund distribution of bednets (and if one’s only goal is malaria control, it’s conceivable that the best option is to fund women’s education).

Thus, even if one is convinced that a particular issue is the “most important” one to work on, this doesn’t by itself establish that one should directly fund or work directly on this issue. The nature of one’s practical opportunities matters greatly. If issue X appears to be of paramount importance, but issue Y has far more appealing giving opportunities for reasons related to room for more funding, one should consider donating toward issue Y.

Of course, a strong project aimed at the “right” problem is likely to have more impact than a strong project aimed at the “wrong” problem, but this isn’t always the choice that a donor faces (particularly a low-information individual donor). The details of what opportunities one has on each front are crucial.

So far, GiveWell has focused on the “easiest” interventions to have confidence in, figuring that being confident of accomplishing some substantial good is better than giving in an uninformed way, even if the latter is aiming at a cause that seems more important than global health. Going forward, we expect to be able to assess other ways of giving, from funding political advocacy to funding scientific research. But we expect to continue to put a substantial weight not just on the importance of an issue but on its tractability and its room for more funding.

Update on GiveWell’s web traffic / money moved: Q1 2013

In addition to evaluations of other charities, GiveWell publishes substantial evaluation on itself, from the quality of its research to its impact on donations. We publish quarterly updates regarding two key metrics: (a) donations to top charities and (b) web traffic.

The table and chart below present basic information about our growth in money moved and web traffic in the first quarter of 2013 (note 1).

Summary statistics: Q1

Growth is at a slower pace than in 2012 (note 2). This may largely be a function of the fact that we are now growing from a larger base from which we can no longer expect percentage increases of the scale we’ve had in the past. Another possibility is that we’re reaching a “saturation point” and growth will now slow significantly. Our arithmetic growth has slowed slightly over the past year, though it is roughly consistent with what it was at this point last year; this is especially true when we consider changes in our ability to measure donations each year.

We believe that some of the apparent slowing in money moved growth is due to better measurement in 2012 than in either 2011 or 2013. We are able to most completely and quickly track donations that (a) go to GiveWell for the support of our top charities; or (b) go directly to AMF (AMF asks donors at the time of donation whether they gave due to GiveWell and immediately makes that information available to us). In early 2011, the majority of donations went directly to VillageReach. In early 2012, the majority of donations went to AMF and to GiveWell for the support of SCI; we were able to track all of these donations when they were given. In early 2013, we had a third charity, GiveDirectly, receiving (we believe) a significant portion of donations directly.

A caveat to all of the above is that this is based solely on small donors. While in the past we’ve seen that growth in small donors earlier in the year provides an indication of overall growth at the end of the year, because a significant proportion of our money moved comes from a relatively small set of large donors, we don’t place significant weight on this projection.

Website traffic tends to peak in December of each year (circled in the chart below). Growth in web traffic has generally remained strong in 2013.


Note 1: Since our 2012 annual metrics report we have shifted to a reporting year that starts on February 1, rather than January 1, in order to better capture year-on-year growth in the peak giving months of December and January. Therefore metrics for the first quarter of 2013 reported below are for February through April.

Note 2: The majority of the funds GiveWell moves come from a relatively small number donors giving larger gifts. These larger donors tend to give in December, and we have found that, in past years, growth in donations from smaller donors throughout the year has provided a reasonable estimate of the growth from the larger donors by the end of the year.

In total, GiveWell donors have directed $604,862 to our top charities this year, compared with $555,749 at this point in 2012. For the reason described, we don’t find this number to be particularly meaningful at this time of year.