The GiveWell Blog

Where we stand on microfinance charity

(updated on: ) | by Holden

We’ve thought and written a lot about microfinance lately. As of now, here’s where we stand.

What microfinance is and isn’t

First, it’s important to recognize that most of what you’ve heard about microfinance is false. It isn’t primarily about funding business expansion.. It isn’t a “proven solution” to poverty. And it doesn’t leverage your donation far more than other options.

Rather, we think of microfinance as a way to help people with low, volatile incomes manage their financial lives, an idea that is well argued in the recent Portfolios of the Poor study. This study implies that microfinance is really about providing one more option for borrowing rather than the only way to borrow, and that the borrowing is continual rather than “one crucial loan to escape poverty” – more like a credit card than a business investment. (This would explain why “graduation” from microlending programs appears rare).

What to look for

Does microfinance do good? It depends on a lot of things.

  • If loans are constantly and heavily subsidized, they can be thought of as similar to giving out cash, in which case our primary concern is that benefits reach the right people.
  • On the other hand, if loans are not subsidized, a microfinance institution’s profits could be taken as a sign that it has paying customers. This in turn could be a sign that it is providing empowerment.

With the latter goal (which seems to be the more common one), there is a big question about what role donations can and should play. We have expressed serious concerns about mixing donations with for-profit enterprises, with the possible result that donations end up padding profits (concept; example). In addition, we worry that there are too many donations blindly chasing the microfinance “story,” with the result that donations end up disappearing into nebulous activities.

There is also a question about the extent to which loans are truly providing empowerment. There is evidence that borrowing is bad for at least some borrowers.

We have developed a set of critical questions both about microlending and microsavings, to get at the question of whether an institution is helping people. We’ve looked hard for organizations that can answer our questions.

What we’ve found

In trying to answer the above questions, we’ve become fairly pessimistic about the area of charitable microfinance in general.

Bottom line

All in all, we would guess that microfinance as a whole has done a great deal of good, but has also probably done some harm. We are more pessimistic specifically about microfinance donations in the current environment. For the reasons outlined above, we believe that giving to an “average” or “typical” microfinance charity – or giving with an illusory “peer to peer” relationship as the extent of your due diligence – is a fairly bad bet. At the very least, it will deliver far less good, and far more potential harm, than the typical microfinance narrative suggests.

Yet we still find the basic idea of providing financial services to people with low and volatile incomes very appealing as a way to help people … if it is done in a way that stresses social impact and uses donations responsibly.

We believe that microsavings is a particularly promising area, although we haven’t found a microsavings charity we can be confident in.

We believe that the Small Enterprise Foundation is a microlending institution that is truly and appropriately focused on achieving positive social impact. We’ll be writing more about it.

VillageReach’s answer to the “room for more funding” question: Scenario analysis

(updated on: ) | by Holden

We’ve just updated our review of our top-rated organization, VillageReach. (Our July 2009 version is still available for posterity.) The big picture remains the same – we feel this organization has a stronger case for cost-effective impact than any other charity we’ve seen – but there have been changes in VillageReach’s financial situation and plans, as well as substantial new information on its answer to the “room for more funding” question.

Ultimately, VillageReach has answered this question in what we consider the “ideal” way: by specifically outlining its projected activities, and outputs, at different levels of projected revenue.

  • VillageReach’s top priority for unrestricted donations is to reactivate its pilot logistics project in Cabo Delgado (the Mozambique province where the project was carried out) and part of Niassa (a neighboring province).
  • It currently has enough funding to expand into one or the other (Cabo Delgado or part of Niassa).
  • About $400,000 in additional funding would close the full gap needed to expand into both over the next year. An additional $1.2 million in needed funds are projected over the full 3 years.
  • Beyond that point, VillageReach has committed to expand into additional provinces at a cost of about $1 million per year.
  • Thus, if VillageReach brings in over $1.5 million in unrestricted donations, we will expect to see it planning further expansion of its logistics program in Mozambique. If it brings in over $2.5 million over the next year, we will likely suspend our recommendation on the basis that it has as much funding as it can productively use.

(Full details available at our discussion of VillageReach’s future activities.)

We know that these numbers are projections, and subject to significant change and error. But what’s valuable about them is that they’re specific enough, and concrete enough, that VillageReach can be held accountable. Based on how much revenue it brings in, we know which activities we can expect it to carry out. This is a truly meaningful projection of the “impact of your donation.” It’s a picture of organization priorities, which can be checked over time (“we will do X if we get $Y”), instead of a discussion of how “your” funds are allocated, which we ultimately can’t see a way to verify in the face of concerns about fungibility.

It’s interesting to me how much work it took to get to this point. When we originally asked VillageReach for “funding gap analysis,” it provided a picture of the minimum amount of funding it would need to continue activities (the October funding gap memo (PDF)). It seems to us that funders often ask the question “Is your organization stable? Are there other funders contributing here?” but rarely ask the question “What is the maximum amount of funding you can productively absorb?”

But we don’t ultimately see why analysis like this should be so rare. The final product here is simple. It’s a matter of being clear about organizational plans and priorities – it doesn’t involve nearly the same kind of complexity and expense as, for example, gauging the impact of past activities.

We feel that it’s feasible for almost any charity to provide substantive, useful, relatively simple information answering “How will future donations be used?” The reason few charities provide it seems to be that few donors push for it.

Incentives for microfinance charities

(updated on: ) | by Holden

I’m very concerned about the incentives for microfinance charities. As I see it, these are the things that they are “rewarded” for:

We feel strongly that there are many more questions a microfinance institution must answer to give an idea of whether it is helping people, and worth donating to. And in theory, many others feel this as well. But looking around MixMarket shows how much more attention the “scale and profits” indicators are getting as of today.

  • The frontpage cites “1,678 total MFIs reporting data” (and we have collected the data, which is overwhelmingly complete on the financial indicators front, for the 268 members of U.S. networks). Yet only 66 institutions have filed social performance reports.
  • The independent ratings found on MixMarket also seem overwhelmingly focused on issues of scale and potential profitability, as opposed to social impact (for a representative example, see the Microrate documents at WISDOM’s profile).

The bottom line? It looks to us like all of the pressure that these institutions face is to maximize scale and profits, without much eye to making sure that they’re improving clients’ lives. And that could explain some eye-popping quotes from publicly available surveys of microfinance dropouts (full documents available at that link; emphasis ours below).

  • “At the end of the meeting the research team watched the process of one group being pressured to complete payment. They were told that they should not leave the meeting until the money was paid. There was heated discussion among them, with members telling each other to contribute, and denying that they themselves had the money with which to contribute. There was Ush. 8,000 missing. Finally a man from another five person group provided the missing money. He told the team that he would probably get the money back from the defaulter (who was not present) and that the defaulter would ‘probably buy him a soda’.” (Uganda report pg 13)
  • “The research team also found one instance where one MFI had started operations in a poor area, issued loans, experienced quite widespread problems with loan repayment and decided to withdraw the programme in its entirety. This resulted in many people’s savings being attached to repay the outstanding loans of others, and the MFI left behind a fair degree of chaos and bad feeling.” (Uganda report pg 13)
  • “the treasurer said that the group’s monthly repayment (Tsh. 300,000) that was to be deposited in SEDA account had been stolen. Two days later the treasurer got very sick; he was bewitched by some of the group members. However after seeing a witchdoctor he recovered. We took him to the Ward Executive Officer; who forced him to repay the money in instalments. He did repay the money but then he was forced to leave Arusha town completely. If he had continued to stay they would have killed him through witchcraft. I lost Tsh. 4,000 through the ROSCA.” (Tanzania report pg 10)
  • “Most MFI’s in Kenya have a very strong emphasis on credit but some are getting into the position where clients are virtually forced to take loans. This is partly because of the MFI’s needs to pump out loans to achieve operational sustainability and partly due to a belief that loans are good for small entrepreneurs – even if they don’t want them!” (Kenya report pg 7)
  • “One of the key determinants of drop-out, often lost in the category ‘failure to repay loan’ by these studies, is the insistence by field staff that clients take loans. Irrespective of what official Head Office policy says, there is a clear understanding among most field staff that they should push out loans – often with little care for whether the clients need or can use them… Matin (1998) also notes, ‘MFI lending technology is insensitive to variations in household conditions. Most MFIs put all households on a treadmill of continuously increasing loan size and insist on a fixed repayment schedule.’” (Bangladesh report pgs 3-4)

You can’t take the “repayment rate” at face value

(updated on: ) | by Holden

We’ve written before about problems with the way a microfinance institution’s “repayment rate” is commonly cited. We’ve been surprised to find that most institutions do not report what most of us would think of as a “repayment rate,” i.e., the percentage of loans/dollars due that have been paid on time. Instead, they report proxies such as “portfolio at risk” that can (theoretically) be very different.

We now have an example of just how different they can be. ID-Ghana, a microfinance institution, has given us permission to post its application for funding from GiveWell. Page 2 discloses that “The write-off ratio has shot up lately because of the clean up that followed the phase out of our old loan products which proved to be inefficient and impactless,” yet the repayment ratio is reported as 99% (same paragraph). That’s because the definition of “repayment ratio” being used ignores loans that have been defaulted on and written off. Only “at-risk” (but still-on-the-books) loans lower this “repayment ratio.”

These charts show how drastic the disrepancy is, particularly from June 2009 on:

To be clear, we think ID-Ghana’s reporting is entirely consistent with standard reporting practices. To a large degree, that’s what worries us. By industry standard reporting practices, a 99% “repayment ratio” can be consistent with a 30%+ default rate – and is in this case.

This is why we’ve insisted on requesting what we call the “real repayment rate”, defined as the percentage of loans that have been paid off on time divided by the percentage of loans that have come due over a given time period (“loans” here can refer to number of loans or dollars lent).

What has shocked us is how few microfinance institutions are able to provide the real repayment rate. In fact, all of the major U.S. microfinance institutions we’ve contacted (excluding FINCA, which declined to apply for funding at all) have explicitly told us that they cannot or will not provide real repayment rates for their partners.

We’ll be writing more about the Small Enterprise Foundation, the only institution that we’ve seen be fully clear about its repayment rate.

Is borrowing good for the borrowers?

(updated on: ) | by Holden

Just because someone is repaying their loans doesn’t mean they’re benefiting from the loans.

We have given some conceptual/anecdotal support for this idea in the past, linking to David Roodman’s posts on possible “overlending” and comparing microloans to payday loans. Lately we’ve been investigating something a bit more concrete: how often, and why, do microfinance clients “drop out” of microlending programs?

The basic idea is that a client could repay a loan due to pressure (from their “lending group” or the microfinance institution), making sacrifices or borrowing from elsewhere (such as moneylenders) to do so. We would expect such clients to show up as “repayers” while not necessarily staying in the program for more loans.

Our observations (details and full sources below):

  • Dropout rates appear substantial, averaging 28% and often exceeding 40%, among institutions that publicly report them (via MixMarket).
  • Survey data on why clients drop out is limited, but what we’ve seen suggests that “graduation” (i.e., moving to better sources of credit or no longer needing credit) is not a common reason for dropping out. Business failure and dissatisfaction with the group/staff/institution are common reasons.
  • A high dropout rate can be consistent with reasonably good reported client satisfaction.

Dropout rates

We have gone through all microfinance institutions that report “social performance reports” on MixMarket (you can see the complete list of institutions, with their publicly posted reports, at MixMarket’s social performance report section) and collected the data into this spreadsheet (XLS). (Note that dropout rates are not on the list of “standard” indicators and are not reported by all MixMarket participants, but are included in “social performance reports.”) Here’s a summary of the 60 institutions that report dropout rates:

Dropout rate range # institutions
Exactly 0% 3
0% to 5% 7
5% to 10% 4
10% to 20% 10
20% to 40% 23
40% to 60% 12
60% to 80% 1
80% to 100% 0

Taking the average across all 60, weighted by number of clients, yields an “average” dropout rate of 28%. Details here (XLS). That implies that in a given year, 28 out of 100 clients become non-clients (see the “social performance reports” for the details of the calculation).

Reasons for dropping out

We don’t know of any comprehensive studies of the reasons clients drop out, but in the process of searching for an outstanding microfinance institution, we have encountered several small-scale surveys. We have posted the non-confidential dropout surveys along with a summary in Excel, and hope to clear a couple more in the future (they are broadly consistent with the summary below).

The Bangladesh study specifically states that “One of the reasons that is notable by its almost complete absence from these listings of grounds for drop-out is ‘graduation’” (pg 4). The rest of the studies give the same picture: “graduation” (i.e., the idea that clients now no longer need microfinance because they can access better sources of credit and/or do not need credit) is not cited as a significant factor in any of them, except in the Uganda study (which does not state how common this factor is, but cites it as a factor specifically for “Relatively Well-off drop-outs” (pg iii)).

Business failure is a commonly cited factor (37-58% of clients cite this factor, in the studies that report numbers – see Excel summary). Issues with the “lending group,” the organization or its staff are the other most common factors. The Tanzania study cites “The inability of clients to cope with the rigid MFI policies and procedures” (pg 9) and also vividly describes a group conflict in which the treasurer claimed funds had been stolen (pg 10). The Bangladesh study states that “One of the key determinants of drop-out … is the insistence by field staff that clients take loans” (pg 3-4).

Client satisfaction

The LAPO study (see previous discussion of LAPO, Kiva’s largest partner) looks not only at the reasons for dropping out, but at overall reported client satisfaction.

The former figures seem cause for concern: there is a dropout rate of around 25% (estimated from graph on pg 7) and reasons given include “poor business performance” (applying to 24.2% of dropouts), “Burden of paying for others who had defaulted” (29.5%), and “the attitude of some staff” (cited as a major factor but without quantification). But overall, reported satisfaction looks reasonably strong:


(Note that the repeating of “Didn’t help me at all” is found in the original table.)

We feel these numbers should be taken with a grain of salt, since it seems possible to us that clients could have felt pressure to report positive experiences. But the numbers do serve as a reminder that microfinance institutions have many clients who are (apparently) happy repeat customers.

Bottom line

Most microfinance institutions don’t appear to publicly report dropout rates, much less the reasons for dropping out (this observation based on the small percentage of MixMarket participants who have shared social performance reports). Those that do are likely to have more encouraging numbers than the others, and yet their numbers seem to leave substantial room for concern. Clients seem to drop out, for overwhelmingly negative reasons, at rates averaging 28% and often exceeding 40%.

We don’t mean to overfocus on the negative here. Microfinance institutions could be providing valuable services for many people, and we wouldn’t want donors to stay away from an activity that’s doing good overall even if it is doing damage to some.

But it does seem that the more we dig through the information on microfinance, the less it resembles the stories commonly told about it. Making loans can do good or harm. We feel strongly that people donating money to microfinance institutions should be asking for substantial due diligence – not anecdotes and pictures, and not the commonly cited, misleading metrics like “repayment rate,” but systematically collected information that gets at services’ actual impact on clients.

Orphanages

(updated on: ) | by Holden

We haven’t done much work on charities that try to help orphans and vulnerable children, and we intend to do more. Here are some preliminary thoughts, though.

At first glance, this area might seem among the simplest and least controversial. SOS Children’s Villages states, “Our sponsors and donors help children whose parents are not there for them. They may be AIDS orphans, street children, child soldiers or children orphaned by war, poverty or natural disasters. We give these children a mother and a family in a home within an SOS Children’s Village. Donations pay to build the Villages and run them until child sponsors cover the running costs.” Could any sort of “impact evaluation” be helpful here? How can one deny that children without homes should be provided homes if at all possible?

However, the picture becomes far more complex upon reading something like Saundra Schimmelpfennig’s series on orphanages.

  • Donor demand for funding orphanages may be outstripping actual need (we have speculated that cleft surgery and microcredit may face similar issues).
  • Many of the children in orphanages are not actually orphans. Parents may send them there because they find caring for them to be too expensive; orphanages may weaken the incentives for children’s other relatives and community members to take them in.
  • If, in fact, orphanages are one option rather than the only option for care, it becomes much more crucial to determine whether they are providing good conditions for children. Ms. Schimmelpfennig raises questions about this issue.
  • There is an ongoing debate in academia about whether abandoned children are better off in institutions or being cared for by relatives/community. One person with field experience told me he personally saw a situation in which he believed that orphanages were actively making the situation worse, and Ms. Schimmelpfennig’s series also implies that this is a serious possibility.

None of this means that donating to orphanages is a bad idea. What it means is that, as usual, the appealing story you see on a charity’s website has a great deal of complexity and open questions behind it. As usual, it is essential to ask critical questions, and not to let your due diligence end with “That sounds like a clear need.”